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ABSTRACT In this article, we explore the conditions under which firms engage in 
transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping in the framework of WTO dispute 
settlement. Classical WTO dispute settlement cases mostly originate in domestic firms 
instigating their public authorities to bring a complaint against foreign trade barriers 
incompatible with WTO law. In recent years, however, we have witnessed the rise of WTO 
cases in which firms get a foreign government to file a case against its own authorities. By 
analysing transnational lobbying by EU firms in the WTO footwear case filed by China 
against the EU, and by US firms in the WTO gambling case Antigua brought against the US, 
we highlight the increasing resemblance between trade disputes and investment disputes 
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INTRODUCTION1 
Transnational lobbying by firms has become a common feature in the political and economic 
environment in which firms operate in the global economy. Within the legal and political 
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), this can take the form of attempts at 
influencing multilateral negotiation outcomes, as well as to co-shape WTO dispute settlement 
outcomes. The role of firms in WTO dispute settlement cases has received increasing 
attention in the literature in recent years. However, the focus so far has been solely on the 
domestic politics of dispute initiation and litigation. That is, most authors portray WTO 
dispute settlement cases in the following manner (Bown, 2009; Davis, 2012; Shaffer, 2003). 
Complainant governments bring WTO dispute settlement cases as a result of political pressure 
by domestic exporting industries interested in foreign market access. On the defendant side, 
import-competing groups that benefit from the disputed trade barriers engage in reactive 
lobbying and want their government to resist the lifting of these barriers. Although this logic 
probably holds for most WTO dispute settlement cases, a different dynamic is emerging in a 
growing number of cases. Increasingly, firms are engaging in transnational lobbying, whereby 
domestic firms lobby a foreign government in order to persuade it to bring a WTO case 
against its own government. 
 Transnational lobbying has been the subject of an important series of studies, 
especially with regard to the negotiation and creation of new international rules in particular 
issue areas – both trade and non trade (Destler and Odell, 1987; Hilmann and Ursprung, 1988; 
Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2002; Tallberg, 2008; Young, 2012). 
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Considerable attention has also been paid to transnational lobbying in the context of judicial 
or quasi-judicial institutions, such as international dispute settlement or arbitration, especially 
in investment treaty dispute settlement and arbitration (Schultz and Dupont, 2014). In this 
context, firms engage in getting their investment rights under bilateral investment treaties 
enforced through legal proceedings with the help of international arbitrators. Yet, because of 
the regime complexity of the many overlapping bilateral investment treaties, firms sometimes 
also engage in strategic venue shopping by setting up foreign affiliates in countries with 
which an investment host country has concluded a bilateral investment treaty. 
The topic of investigation in this article bears a resemblance to these transnational 
political activities by firms in the context of bilateral investment treaties. Transnational 
lobbying activity by firms in the framework of WTO dispute settlement, however, has a 
distinctive quality in that it is states, not firms, which engage in WTO inter-state dispute 
settlement. Yet, increasingly, internationally active firms do not just instigate their home 
governmental authorities to file a WTO complaint on their behalf, but sometimes also push 
foreign governments to file a WTO complaint against policies of their own home government. 
Whereas in most WTO dispute settlement cases the lobbying originates in firms targeting 
their home government in order to induce a foreign government to eliminate WTO-
incompatible barriers to trade, sometimes firms also target foreign governments and try to 
persuade them to enforce WTO market-opening commitments within their own home country. 
As we explore below, firms engaging in this type of transnational lobbying and foreign venue 
shopping are generally multinational firms sourcing from abroad or firms with foreign 
subsidiaries, that are confronted with an unresponsive home government and use the 
opportunities of the multiple venues available within the institutions of the multilateral trading 
system to try and obtain policies favourable to themselves. 
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Our purpose is to find out what conditions and motives might lead firms to adopt this 
strategy, as well as to show how such political dynamics played out in two prominent WTO 
dispute settlement cases. While a number of conditions apparently have to be fulfilled for 
firms to be able and willing to engage in transnational lobbying of foreign governments to 
bring a case against their home government, what turns out to be key are the reasons for the 
home government’s unresponsiveness to firms’ demands. Based on original interview data 
with key actors involved in WTO dispute settlement cases involving transnational lobbying 
and foreign venue shopping, we present two case studies. One is a case study of transnational 
lobbying by European Union (EU) firms in a WTO dispute settlement case about footwear 
filed by China against the EU, and the other looks at transnational lobbying by United States 
(US) firms in a WTO case brought by the Antiguan authorities against US gambling laws. 
We structure the article as follows. In the next section, we review existing scholarship 
on firms’ usage of WTO dispute settlement, which has so far focused pre-dominantly on 
domestic lobbying. We then explore the conditions and motives that might lead firms to 
engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping, taking advantage of inter-state 
WTO dispute settlement. We go on to provide a detailed empirical analysis of two cases that 
are emblematic of transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping. We conclude with a 
discussion of the results and some remarks on avenues for further research. 
 
DOMESTIC LOBBYING FOR WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
During its nearly 20 years of existence, a significant literature on WTO dispute settlement has 
developed (for an overview, see Bernauer et al, 2012). The part of that literature that has 
focused on firms’ involvement in the political process has hitherto focussed on domestic 
lobbying. 
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One important strand of this literature has looked at the legal status of firms in WTO 
law, concluding that, legally, firms have few direct rights in WTO dispute settlement cases 
and that trade disputes are primarily an inter-governmental affair. Only governments can 
bring claims and, also during a case, the official legal role of firms remains limited. Firms do 
have two forms of legal rights. First, they have the right to information during dispute 
settlement cases and the possibility to submit so-called amicus curiae, i.e. to provide briefs to 
the court. Second, in some WTO members, firms have the option to petition their home 
government to initiate trade disputes, e.g., under the Section 301 procedure in the US and the 
Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) procedure in the EU. These studies have raised the question 
whether firms should acquire legal standing in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and what 
the possible implications of such a step would be (Catabagan, 2009; Mavroidis et al., 1998; 
Trachtman, 2003; Trachtman and Moremen, 2003). Although there is some disagreement 
among the authors of these studies about the desirability and exact effect of a change in legal 
status for firms in dispute settlement, most plead for more legal rights for business. According 
to Catabagan (2009), for instance, giving non-state actors in developing countries the 
opportunity to bring a claim against WTO members could ensure greater equality in WTO 
dispute resolution. 
Others have traced the origins of the aforementioned legal mechanisms for business 
participation in WTO dispute settlement and ask whether firms make use of these tools 
(Sherman and Eliasson, 2006; Hernandez-Lopez, 2001). Firms are found to make infrequent 
use of the option of submitting amicus curiae briefs and of the formal petition procedures that 
are put in place to allow firms to request the initiation of a WTO dispute by their government. 
Also, in their comparative study on the Section 301 in the US and the TBR in the EU, 
Sherman and Eliasson (2006) conclude that only a very small percentage of the hundreds of 
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disputes launched by the US and, especially, by the EU are initiated through a Section 301 or 
TBR petition by private parties. 
Notwithstanding the useful insights obtained from an often normative literature on the 
limited legal standing of firms in WTO law and the relatively infrequent use of the legal 
mechanisms for private participation in WTO dispute settlement, this literature neglects an 
important aspect of business involvement in trade policy disputes: the many informal 
channels available through which firms can influence trade policy-making. Some scholars 
have looked into the more informal process of government–business interactions in the 
context of WTO dispute settlement, focussing on domestic lobbying. A couple of early WTO 
dispute settlement cases stand out in this respect: the so-called Kodak-Fuji case, the case filed 
by the US against the EU’s discriminatory banana import regime, and the Airbus-Boeing 
disputes between the EU and the US. In an analysis of the “Japan Film” case, Dunoff (1998) 
shows how the US-based firm Kodak mobilized politically, convinced the US government to 
file a WTO case, and used all means available to enhance its market access to the protected 
Japanese film market. The Japanese firm Fuji, afraid of losing a great deal of its domestic 
market share and of being affected by possible US sanctions, engaged in reactive lobbying 
during the unfolding of the case. In other words, Kodak and Fuji operated as the de facto 
complainant and defendant in the Japan film dispute, as the US and Japanese governments 
turned out to be extremely responsive to the demands of these large firms with political clout. 
This is reflected in the habit of analysts to refer to the case as the Kodak-Fuji case, instead of 
the US-Japan case on Photographic Film and Paper. The banana saga on the other hand 
involved an untypically large number of complainant countries and dragged on for an 
untypically long time (Alter and Meunier, 2006; Poletti and De Bièvre, 2014; Fattore and 
Allison, 2013). Yet the banana case would seem to bear a resemblance to the new type of 
transnational lobbying driven WTO dispute settlement cases that we explore in this article. 
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Indeed, the most important and most tenacious of the complainants against the EU’s 
discriminatory banana import regime turned out to be the US government, and not the Latin-
American banana- producing countries that suffered export losses as a result of the EU’s 
policies. The lobbying dynamic, however, was of the traditional domestic pressure type, as the 
chief executive officer of Chiquita, Lindner, instigated the US government to help rescue his 
tropical fruit distribution multinational, when it was threatened with bankruptcy, in exchange 
for election campaign contributions to US politicians (Fattore and Allison, 2013). 
A similar, but somewhat more systematic analysis is put forward by Shaffer (2003; 
2006) and colleagues (Shaffer et al., 2008). This analysis describes the vital role played by, 
what Shaffer calls, public–private networks in WTO litigation involving the EU, US and 
Brazil. Within these networks, decision-makers and industry representatives come together on 
an ad hoc, i.e. case by case, basis to (a) evaluate the costs and benefits of bringing a WTO 
claim and, if a case is brought, (b) cooperate during the litigation process. The establishment 
of these public–private partnerships is, Shaffer argues, in large part due to resource 
interdependencies. In WTO dispute settlement, industry is dependent on public actors 
primarily for access to the WTO litigation process, as only WTO members may bring a claim 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, whereas public actors are dependent on industry 
for financial, informational, political and organizational resources. As resources are limited 
and deploying them is a costly affair, public and private actors also make their decision to 
participate in a WTO dispute on the basis of the relative stakes in the outcome of the dispute 
in question. These stakes are taken to be a function of the per capita benefits and 
(informational and organizational) costs of participating. 
What the aforementioned literature shows us is that domestic decision-makers rely 
upon industry to inform them about foreign trade barriers and that WTO litigation typically 
involves public–private partnerships in which demands from industry are the usual starting 
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point. What remains under-researched, however, is what type of firms and industries become 
involved in WTO dispute settlement cases and under what circumstances they mobilize 
politically. Bown (2009) takes an important first step in shedding light on these issues. He 
starts from the observation that, given the formidable costs of WTO enforcement, not all firms 
can and will engage in pushing their government towards WTO litigation. In any country, 
only a relatively small fraction of all firms is able to do so. In particular, firms from advanced 
industrialized WTO members, operating in consolidated sectors, are able to sustain such a 
prolonged collective action effort all the way up to the sought-after prize of a panel ruling in 
their favour (Bown, 2009; Bown and Hoekman, 2005). In order to assess the costs of WTO 
enforcement and identify which firms are able to afford these costs, Bown (2009) 
distinguishes three phases – pre-litigation, litigation and post-litigation – each of which 
imposes large costs on firms wanting to pursue WTO rule enforcement. He concludes that the 
driving forces behind most WTO trade disputes are large and highly-productive exporting 
firms, which use WTO litigation to (self)enforce access to foreign markets. 
A final noteworthy contribution to the study of firms in WTO dispute settlement is the 
recent book by Davis (2012). Davis starts from the observation that many WTO-inconsistent 
policies are not challenged, but are either ignored or addressed in other venues. The central 
question Davis addresses is why countries in some cases choose to file a WTO complaint to 
solve a trade dispute, whereas on other occasions they deal with it outside the realm of the 
WTO. Her argument is as follows. If domestic exporters expect their government to be too 
soft on foreign trade partners in negotiating market access, or when there is uncertainty about 
the willingness of foreign governments to give in to these demands of market opening, the 
export industry is likely to be less inclined to offer political contributions or other kinds of 
political support. As a result of this credibility problem, a government will bring a WTO 
complaint to show its commitment to the domestic interest group. At the same time, the 
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import-competing industry in the defendant country will push its government not to settle the 
dispute during the consultation stage. As the defendant government also wants to demonstrate 
its commitment to the domestic industry, it will give in to the demands of the industry and opt 
for litigation. In other words, “interest group pressure on both sides of a trade dispute pushes 
politicized trade topics into dispute adjudication” (Davis, 2012: 21). 
The existing literature has thus provided us with important insights into the state–
society nexus driving WTO dispute settlement, showing that in classic WTO cases, 
complainant governments try to satisfy the demands of domestic export-oriented firms 
lobbying in favour of market access abroad, while defendant governments try and satisfy the 
demands of import-competing firms. In recent years, however, an increasing number of WTO 
cases have been driven by transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping by domestic 
firms in order to challenge WTO-inconsistent measures in their own home country. 
 
TRANSNATIONAL LOBBYING AS FOREIGN VENUE SHOPPING IN WTO 
LITIGATION 
The literature on venue (or ‘forum’) shopping in international politics has recently begun to 
explore the systematic conditions under which societal actors and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as business actors, adopt this strategy (e.g. Alter and Meunier, 
2009; De Bièvre et al., 2014; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2008; for an excellent recent 
literature overview, see Murphy and Kellow, 2013). One finding is that regime complexity 
can affect choices available to societal actors and may provide actors with opportunities to 
target particular international organizations or the institutions these actors deem most 
favourably disposed towards their policy preferences. Such international venue shopping, 
however, is geared towards the negotiation of new rules, not towards litigation on and 
enforcement of existing ones. When societal actors engage in such transnational lobbying 
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activities they can also choose to target a foreign government directly (Moravcsik, 1993) in 
order to create a boomerang effect for an initially unresponsive domestic government (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998). Such strategies may be employed in the framework of international 
economic negotiations such as G8 summits, WTO Ministerial Conferences, the International 
Climate Conferences, or within specialized committees within the United Nations system, 
where state representatives convene to establish new global rules in the form of primary or 
secondary international law. These strategies may also prove beneficial to them in a litigation 
context if they choose the most favourable judicial venue to obtain compliance with already 
existing rules, as is often the case in investment dispute settlement. Another such judicial 
route is to mobilize governments to file a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 
convening on the banks of Lac Léman in Geneva. 
 A decision by firms to convince a foreign government to bring a WTO dispute 
settlement case against its own domestic government, could be driven by a number of distinct 
reasons and motives. We argue that the key precondition to trigger the kind of firm behaviour 
that interests us here is the lack of responsiveness of the domestic government. That is, going 
transnational by targeting a foreign government becomes an option only if the domestic 
government is unresponsive to particular political-economic demands of a firm. A 
government may be unresponsive to the demands of its own domestic firms for a wide variety 
of reasons. 
 One such reason is that the firms in favour of the domestic trade barriers may have 
more domestic political clout than those facing losses as a result of the trade restrictions. The 
firm or firms suffering from the trade-restrictive measures may thus find themselves in a 
marginal domestic political position. They may be operating in sectors that do not have a clear 
and immediately visible positive economic impact on the domestic economy. This applies, for 
example, where production takes place abroad and hence the sector concerned does not 
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contribute significantly to direct employment – which means that domestic decision-makers 
have no real incentives to take their interests into account. What is more, they may provide 
services or produce politically sensitive or controversial products (e.g. products with possible 
negative effects on people’s health or the environment), which means that domestic 
politicians may see it as a political risk to give in to their demands. Whatever the exact reason 
for their marginal political position, such firms remain domestically impotent, even if they are 
able to mobilize politically. When this happens, the firms can either decide simply to accept 
the domestic trade barriers or they can engage in a form of international venue shopping and 
try to convince a foreign government to bring a WTO case against their home state. The latter 
option is not feasible for all societal interests and will only become a likely scenario under the 
same type of conditions that the existing literature on domestic lobbying for WTO dispute 
settlement has identified. These include overcoming collective action problems in order to 
proceed to the precise identification of the domestic WTO-inconsistent policy. Moreover, 
firms wanting to engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping have to 
estimate – both for themselves and for the foreign government – the economic benefits of 
removing the WTO-inconsistent policy, and they have to gain access to the policy-making 
process in the foreign country. This whole process is very time consuming and costly.2 
 Transnational lobbying targeted at a foreign government to convince it to bring a 
WTO complaint is thus even more demanding of time and resources than domestic lobbying 
for WTO dispute settlement. Thus the precondition of being a consolidated, well-endowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A point that we do not explicitly address here, but that is nevertheless important, is that lobbying against their 
own national government may be politically costly for the firms in question. After all, if a government finds out 
that a particular WTO case has been brought as a result of lobbying from a domestic firm (or group of firms), 
this may further decrease its political clout. Firms will therefore only consider transnational lobbying if they 
have a very strong incentive to do so and they will usually do everything they can to keep it a secret that they 
were behind a WTO case.  
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and well-organized sector becomes even more important if firms are to be able to mobilize 
politically and keep investing in producing the collective good of detailed information the 
foreign government can use in the process of WTO litigation. A particularly tricky hurdle that 
a firm (or group of firms) wanting to engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue 
shopping has to overcome is to convince the foreign government that it is in its best interest to 
bring the foreign firm’s case to the WTO. Such a congruence of interests of this firm or these 
firms and the government of a foreign WTO member can take the form of employment and 
investment opportunities that would arise, exactly the type of resource the firm would be 
lacking in its home country. Moreover, they must generate and/or contribute to winning 
policy coalitions in order to influence decision-making in the desired direction – i.e. 
convincing the foreign government to pursue the case at the WTO. Finally, once they have 
managed to convince the foreign government to file and pursue the legal case in Geneva, they 
have to continue to come up with convincing legal and economic evidence in support of the 
case. 
 Taken together, the elements outlined above would seem to constitute necessary 
conditions for firms to engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping in the 
framework of WTO litigation. Below, we exemplify whether and the extent to which these 
motives and preconditions play out in an empirical treatment of two prominent cases of 
transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping for WTO dispute settlement: a case in 
which EU firms in the footwear sector instigated the Chinese government to bring a WTO 
case against the EU, and a case in which US gambling firms instigated the Antiguan 
government to bring a WTO complaint against the US government. 
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TRANSNATIONAL LOBBYING AND FOREIGN VENUE SHOPPING IN TWO WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES 
We went about selecting our cases in the following way. We first obtained the complete list of 
all WTO dispute settlement cases as they are listed systematically in existing databases.3 We 
limited the time period by focusing on episodes that took place in the last 10 years, as 
qualitative, in-depth interview evidence is more comprehensively and reliably obtainable for 
more recent patterns of lobbying.4 Third, we gathered as much information as possible on all 
the potential cases to determine whether transnational or domestic lobbying lay at the origin 
of the WTO complaints. Given the closed-door nature of the WTO dispute settlement process, 
this is not a priori obvious. We gathered the information by looking at primary and secondary 
sources, as well as by conducting a series of interviews5 with WTO dispute settlement experts 
and observers on the role of firms during the initiation of the cases. In this way, we arrived at 
a set of WTO dispute settlement cases that were likely to have been spurred by transnational 
lobbying. This allowed us to discard obvious cases of domestic lobbying leading a home 
government to file a WTO complaint, as in the Kodak- Fuji case or the numerous banana 
cases.	  
 Based on this analysis, we identified four possible case studies. First, international 
tobacco firms engaged in a lobbying effort and convinced the governments of several WTO 
members, namely Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia and Ukraine to file a 
WTO complaint against Australia’s rules on plain packaging for tobacco products. Second, 
the alleged involvement of US and EU importers of solar panels in WTO complaints filed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a full list of cases see: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes and 
WorldTradeLaw.net.  
4 A full list of all our interviewees is available upon request.   
5 These interviews with WTO experts and observers were conducted in Brussels, Geneva and by phone on 
8 January 2010, 18 February 2010, 25 March 2010, 7 April 2010 and 25 March 2013.     
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China against (a) US import duties on solar panels; and (b) Greece and Italy regarding certain 
measures affecting the renewable energy generation sector. Third, we found a grouping of 
American gambling and betting firms to be at the origin of the WTO complaint brought by 
Antigua and Barbuda against the US regarding measures affecting the cross-border supply of 
gambling and betting services. Fourth, we identified European footwear associations to be at 
the origin of China’s WTO complaint against EU anti-dumping measures on imports of 
footwear from China. 
 We decided to focus our in-depth analysis on the last two cases mentioned (i.e. the 
Antigua–US gambling case and the China–EU footwear case) for the following reasons. First, 
both policy processes were already finished when we started our investigations; this made it 
easier to collect evidence, especially interview information, and obtain a comprehensive 
overview of all aspects of the case. Moreover, these cases were aimed at the EU and the US, 
which remain the most important participants in the world trading system in terms of share of 
world trade, and are relatively transparent political systems, because of their democratic 
nature. It is certainly no coincidence that we find cases of transnational lobbying and foreign 
venue shopping in WTO dispute settlement in these jurisdictions, since firms in these two 
WTO members display a high degree of internationalism. 
 In what follows, we trace the process of transnational lobbying and foreign venue 
shopping in the two cases selected. Our evidence is based on a set of semi-structured 
interviews conducted by the authors, as well as a careful study of primary and secondary 
sources. 
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US gambling firms and transnational lobbying through Antigua: a business “boomerang” 
against a US ban on Internet sports betting (2003–2013) 
During the 1990s, as the Internet quickly grew in popularity and “governments, businesses, 
and media outlets raced to get themselves online, acquiring domain names and setting up Web 
sites,” gaming became one of the “most immediately proliferating online industries” 
(Schwartz, 2005: 176–77). From the very beginning, there was a fierce political debate in the 
US as to whether online gaming in general and Internet gambling in particular could and 
should be prohibited. Under pressure from traditional gambling industries (e.g. casinos), 
religious groups and professional sports leagues in the US – which had all set up intensive 
lobby campaigns against Internet gambling in general and sports betting operations on the 
Internet in particular – around 2001 some US states (i.e. Louisiana, Massachusetts, South 
Dakota and Utah) and the Federal Government adopted (or altered) several laws in order to 
restrict online gambling on sport events.6 However, Internet betting offered by some US-
based companies on horse races (like Youbet.com and Xpressbet.com) – as well as lotteries 
and other games in some US states – was still allowed under these new laws, while the supply 
of betting services from companies based (or partly based) in other WTO members to the US 
on a cross-border basis was prohibited entirely (Thayer, 2004; Washington Post, 2006). 
 In response to the discriminatory and thus WTO-incompatible nature of these laws, 
Antigua and Barbuda – a twin-island nation located in the middle of the Leeward Islands in 
the Eastern Caribbean – brought a WTO dispute settlement case against the US7 arguing that 
US policy violated the principle of "national treatment” (see Kilby, 2008; Blustein, 2009).8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The three US federal laws of interest here were the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business 
Act.  
7 See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm, last retrieved 20 July 2014.    
8 That is, the principle that requires a government to treat goods and services produced in or supplied by 
companies located abroad the same as domestic ones.  
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Preventing companies located in Antigua from entering the US market was also a violation of 
promises made a few years earlier by the US. When Antigua started to introduce laws aimed 
at attracting online betting operators in the 1990s, Antiguan officials interacted closely with 
US officials and in these talks it was made clear to the Antiguan Officials that the online 
gambling scheme was not in violation of any US laws. Yet, a few years later, the US adopted 
the aforementioned laws, which made it practically impossible for Antigua-based companies 
to enter the US market.9 What is more, Washington had pledged in a trade treaty to open the 
US market in "recreational, cultural and sporting services" to global competition (Washington 
Post, 2006). Transnational lobbying by US Internet gambling companies, which were (partly) 
based in Antigua, played a pivotal role in the decision of the Antiguan government the file a 
WTO dispute settlement case against the US. In this section we trace the causes and effects of 
this case of transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping by US online betting firms. 
However, before we turn to our analysis on transnational lobbying, a few words on why we 
treat these Antigua-based betting firms as US companies rather than Antiguan ones are 
warranted. It is widely acknowledged that, as a result of the borderlessness and anonymity of 
online gambling, it is very difficult to regulate the sector (Whol, 2009). It is equally difficult, 
for the same reasons, to determine the exact nationality of online gaming operators. There are 
three reasons why we believe it is plausible to treat the Antigua-based companies as US firms. 
First, the majority of the betting companies have US owners and managers. As a result 
of the very favourable infrastructure that supported online gambling and betting services,10 
which was set up by the Antiguan government in the 1990s (Schwartz, 2005), the number of 
licensed Internet gambling and betting operations in Antigua grew from almost none at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Telephone interview, 25 March 2013. 
10 In the words of Schwarz (2005: 178) “Antigua created a free-trade zone in which cross-border betting 
operators could take bets without paying corporate taxes, though they did pay licensing fees and were subject to 
regulation.” 
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beginning of the 1990s to more than 100 around 2000.11 As a result, the island became one of 
the key global centres of online gambling. Although it is difficult to find reliable figures about 
ownership of these companies, interviews12 and other sources (see e.g. Schwarz, 2005) 
confirm that most of the firms in question have US owners and that, at the very least, the 
companies that were behind the lobbying campaign we describe in this article are almost all 
owned by American citizens. 
Second, the vast majority of their customers are based in the US. Although, again, 
figures are hard to come by, it is clear that the percentage of revenues generated by the US 
customers of these Antigua-based companies is very high. For instance, in 2000, World 
Sports Exchange Ltd, – at that time the biggest Internet gambling web site located in Antigua 
– “accepted $200 million in sports wagers, 95% of which came from bettors in the US” 
(Businessweek, 2000). Similar figures are mentioned by our interview partners for other 
firms.13 Small wonder that after the US adopted its restrictive laws from 2001 onwards – 
which made it much more difficult for the companies to serve their US customers – the 
number of companies in Antigua decreased drastically (from more than 100 in 2000 to only 
30 in 2007 and still fewer today) and total revenue dropped from well over $2 billion in 2000 
(that is 61% of total global online gambling) to way below $1 billion in 2007 (or less than 7% 
of total global online gambling).14 
Third, in the US itself the firms in question were treated as US firms. For instance in a 
legal case against World Sports Exchange (WSE) (see below for more details), US 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Source: http://www.antiguawto.com/WTO_Economic_gambling_data.html, last retrieved 1 October 2014.  
12  Telephone interview, 25 March 2013. 
13 Telephone interview, 29 July 2014.	  
14 Source: http://www.antiguawto.com/WTO_Economic_gambling_data.html, last retrieved 1 October 2014. See 
also: http://www.forbes.com/sites/markgibbs/2013/01/29/pirates-of-the-caribbean-antigua-and-barbuda-turn-
from-internet-gambling-to-legalized-piracy/, last retrieved 1 October 2014. 	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prosecutors spend a great deal of time proving that WSE was a US firm. As Schwarz (2005: 
205) points out, in his very detailed account of the court case, the US prosecutors referred to 
the large number of US customers, the fact that their advertising strategy was fully aimed at 
the US market and in light of this that “the [WSE] retained American advertising and public 
relations firms to increase its business in the United States.” 
Now let us turn to the transnational lobby campaign of the US Internet gambling firms 
based in Antigua, which was obviously triggered first and foremost by the imposition of the 
aforementioned protectionist measures by the US government. The introduction of these 
restrictive laws came as a big surprise to the companies in question. After all, a few years 
earlier the US authorities had assured them that there was no legal problem with the Antiguan 
gambling scheme, so “the US betting operators had every reason to believe that they could 
safely move their operations to Antigua.”15 After the introduction of the protectionist US 
laws, the gambling firms tried to convince the US authorities to lift the barriers, but the US 
government was unresponsive to these demands. That the US authorities were indeed 
unwilling to take into account the demands of the US online betting companies in Antigua 
was clear from the outset. The gambling firms pushed for the removal of the restrictive and 
protectionist measures, yet state and federal Governments tried time and again to adopt ever 
more far-reaching laws to restrict online betting operations. When it became clear that US 
Congress was not able to pass a bill to ban Internet betting entirely, they tried to crack down 
on the US betting companies by means of prosecuting Internet gambling operators. Legal 
action was aimed in particular at those firms with overseas branches and/or servers in 
countries like Antigua (Schwarz, 2005). 
 Although legal action was taken at both federal and state level, the most active were 
state attorneys general. The strategy used by the latter was to prosecute US betting firms from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Telephone interview, 29 July 2014.  
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all over the country in those states where betting was illegal (in particular Missouri). Schwarz 
(2005: 201) explains the legal rationale behind this strategy: “[w]ith the determination that the 
betting activity took place at the site of the bettor, not at the gaming site, attorneys general 
gained free rein to prosecute out-of-state operators that permitted state residents to bet.” As 
the majority of the US firms with branches in Antigua were US-owned, they also faced these 
civil and criminal proceedings. The most famous of these cases was the lawsuit against Jay 
Cohen, one of the American owners of the Antigua-based company World Sports Exchange 
Ltd. Cohen “became the first person to be convicted on federal charges of running an illegal 
offshore Internet sports gambling operation…[and] was sentenced to nearly two years in 
prison” for its alleged illegal Internet gambling business activities in Antigua (The New York 
Times, 2000). 
US authorities could afford to be unresponsive to the demands of the US online 
gambling firms because of their lack of domestic political clout. Also, the addictive and health 
risks of gambling in general and the possible negative consequences as a result of sports 
betting (e.g. match fixing) in particular, meant that it was politically risky for US policy-
makers to give in to the demands of the online betting operators. In addition, these betting 
firms operated from abroad (i.e. from Antigua) and contributed very little to the US economy 
in terms of employment and tax revenues.16 Finally, the online betting firms were confronted 
with powerful counter-lobbies of three distinct groups of opponents of Internet betting. The 
first of these groups consisted of casinos, racetracks and other more traditional 
betting/gambling industries, as they were afraid of the competition. The second were religious 
groups, as well as the social conservatives who “were appalled at the moral decay that would 
doubtless follow if every pc could be used as a slot machine.” The third group comprised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Telephone interview, 25 March 2013. 
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professional sports leagues in the US, which fiercely objected to Internet gambling, as it 
stimulated betting on games, which they opposed (Schwarz, 2005: 187). 
 Since the US authorities were unresponsive to the demands of the US online betting 
operators in Antigua and these firms were almost wholly dependent on US consumers they 
had a very strong incentive to turn to another venue to make their voice heard: the 
government of Antigua. The Antiguan government provided them with access to the global 
governance structure of WTO dispute settlement. In order to convince the authorities in 
Antigua to bring a WTO case against the US, the gambling firms in question set up a 
widespread lobby campaign. 
 US gambling companies based in Antigua were able to engage in this act of 
transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping because a number of crucial preconditions 
for transnational lobbying, as presented above, were met.17 For one, collective action costs 
were relatively low. The concentration ratio of US companies in Antigua was high: a small 
number of big companies dominated the market. In addition, the firms in question were 
geographically concentrated, as their branches were all located on a very small strip of land 
on the island of Antigua. What is more, the online betting firms had little problem in 
identifying the WTO-illegal trade practices of the US, as a) they were all directly or indirectly 
hurt by the strict US laws, which severely restricted their access to the US market and b) as 
they were well-endowed, the betting firms could afford to hire a team of lawyers to work 
almost full time on preparing the WTO case. Finally, the US Internet gambling companies 
were able to form a coalition of like-minded firms and to establish an ad-hoc interest group, 
the Antigua Online Gaming Association (AOGA), to enable them to coordinate and 
streamline all their political and legal activities. The headquarters of the AOGA, which 
consisted of 50 online betting operators, was set up in the US (El Paso, Texas) and was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This section is based on interviews, by phone, 25 March 2013 and 29 July 2014. 
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registered at the same address as the law firm of Mark Mendel, the American attorney 
representing the US companies based in Antigua (The Boston Globe, 2006). 
 Our interview partners clearly confirmed that the efforts of the AOGA were crucial in 
instigating the Antiguan authorities to bring the WTO dispute settlement case against the 
restrictive US gambling policies. It was the AOGA lawyer, Mark Mendel, who came up with 
the idea to file a WTO complaint. After the AOGA members had agreed to the idea, a team of 
AOGA representatives then tried to persuade the Antiguan government. To this end, they 
organized meetings with Sir Ronald Sanders, who was then Antigua's ambassador to Britain 
and the WTO, as well as the Prime Minister of Antigua.18 One interviewee recalls that it “was 
surprisingly easy to convince the Antiguan authorities to pursue with the WTO case against 
the US.”19 Three factors were pivotal for the decision by the Antiguan authorities to go ahead 
with the case. First, the betting industry was of enormous importance for the Antiguan 
economy20 and the US protectionist policies had led to a severe economic downturn in the 
gambling and betting services. WTO ambassador, Ronald Sanders, declared later in an 
interview about the decision to bring the case: "[d]id we not have a duty to our citizens to 
protect their jobs?" (quoted in Blustein, 2009: 167). The second factor that played a key role 
in the decision of the Antiguan government to file the WTO complaint was that the AOGA 
“agreed to fund all the third party legal costs during the entire case” and offered the services 
of Mr Mendel (the AOGA lawyer) to represent Antigua during the WTO case.21 Finally, the 
Antiguan authorities had not forgotten about the “insulting amount of development aid 
[$20.000] the US had given them in the aftermath of a hurricane that had hit the island 2 years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Telephone interview, 29 July 2014. 
19 Ibid. 
20 In those days more than 4000 people (out of a population of 80,000) worked in the betting industry, making it 
the islands’ second-largest employer, after tourism.	  
21 Telephone interview, 29 July 2014.  
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earlier.”22 
 At beginning of 2003, Antigua and Barbuda thus filed their request at the WTO for 
consultations with the US about the alleged WTO-inconsistency of US policy regarding the 
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.23 Throughout the case there was close 
cooperation between the firms, the Antigua Online Gaming Association (AOGA), the legal 
team in Texas and the government of Antigua and Barbuda, and their efforts paid off.24 
Although Antigua had brought the legal case in a somewhat clumsy way by merely listing 93 
US laws, instead of presenting a detailed list of WTO-illegal measures (Munin, 2011), the 
WTO panel –established in June 2003, after consultations between the US and Antigua had 
failed – ruled against the US to everyone’s surprise, in November 2004. The trade body gave 
the US one year to comply with its ruling. That deadline passed with a short statement from 
the US that, after a review of its laws, it had decided that it had been in compliance with WTO 
rules all along (The New York Times, 2007a; 2007b).25 The case then went to the arbitration 
body of the WTO (a so-called Article 21.5 panel), charged with assessing damages as a result 
of non-compliance with WTO rulings. In March 2007, the panel concluded that the United 
States had failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) and gave Antigua the right to take countermeasures.26 However, given that 
Antigua's economy is so tiny, few US companies would notice any (traditional) trade-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 
23 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/1, S/L/110, Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, see for more details: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm, last retrieved 22 April 2014. 
24 Telephone interview, 25 March 2013. 
25 The Bush administration had tried to secure legislation "clarifying" that all forms of online betting are illegal, 
but the horse racing industry in the US was able to block such efforts on Capitol Hill (Washington Post, 2006). 
26 See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm, last retrieved 22 April 2014.  
	   23 
	  
restrictive measures against the US on the part of Antigua. The Antiguan government 
therefore decided to start negotiations with the US in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
solution. As these negotiations dragged on for years without any real result, the Antiguan side 
finally (in 2013) made an unexpected move and asked the WTO for the right to impose 
sanctions that would hurt the US, namely, permission to copy and export US-made DVDs, 
CDs and similar material – i.e. cross-retaliation by suspending obligations under the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). On 28 January 
2013, the DSB agreed to grant authorization to suspend concessions and obligations to the US 
in respect of intellectual property rights.27 In fact, if it had not been for the involvement of 
transnational firms, such creativity in crafting retaliatory measures would have been barely 
conceivable. 
The unresponsiveness of the American government to the demands of its gambling 
industry boomeranged back at them when these firms turned to another venue, which also 
potentially provided them with access to the global governance structure of WTO dispute 
settlement, namely, the Antiguan government. Suffering from the negative consequences of 
US policies just like some American firms, the Antiguan government agreed to back these 
firms’ efforts and successfully challenged the legality of American policies. The firms in 
question were able to sustain their considerable lobbying coordination effort over a number of 
years, as their legal case was quite straightforward, they were not hampered by large 
collective action problems, and the WTO dispute settlement rules provided them with a 
retaliation that no small WTO member had hitherto dared to actually use: the threat to start 
copying American films and DVDs by suspending its obligations under the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid.  
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EU footwear multinationals and transnational lobbying through China: an anti-dumping 
“boomerang” at the WTO (2006–2012) 
At the beginning of 2005, the EU lifted its quotas on Chinese footwear imports. The removal 
of these quotas, which had been in place for decades, immediately resulted in a vast increase 
in imports of Chinese shoes into the EU market. In response to this situation, import-
competing EU footwear producers in countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Poland, 
spurred their European umbrella organization – the European Confederation of the Footwear 
Industry (CEC) – to file an anti-dumping (AD) complaint against China with the Directorate 
for Trade Defence of the European Commission. The Directorate for Trade Defence did 
indeed decide to impose anti-dumping duties on Chinese footwear products in 2006 and also 
agreed with an extension of the duties in 2009 (Eckhardt, 2011). After the decision of the EU 
to extend the duties, the Chinese government brought a WTO dispute settlement case against 
the EU, claiming that the duties were WTO-inconsistent.28 Whereas domestic European 
producers competing with Chinese imports had been at the origin of the EU anti-dumping 
measures, transnational lobbying by EU footwear multinationals dependent on Chinese 
footwear imports played a decisive role in the Chinese authorities’ decision to challenge these 
measures through a WTO dispute settlement case. In what follows, we trace the causes and 
effects of this instance of transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping by EU footwear 
multinationals. 
 First and foremost, these EU firms were crucially dependent on Chinese footwear 
imports and found themselves confronted with unresponsive domestic EU authorities. This 
incited them to engage in transnational lobbying to try and convince the Chinese government 
to challenge the imposition and extension of anti-dumping duties that were limiting Chinese 
footwear imports into the EU. The fact that the EU did not respond to the demands of EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds405_e.htm.   
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footwear importers was not the result of unclear policy preferences or a lack of lobbying 
activity. On the contrary, the demands of these firms were crystal clear: no imposition of AD 
duties. Moreover, they were very vocal and politically active during the entire anti-dumping 
case. That is, the firms in question put constant and heavy political pressure on both national- 
and EU-level officials to convince them to abstain from putting the duties in place. In order to 
coordinate their lobbying activities, the footwear importers even established two ad-hoc 
interest groups with the sole purpose of blocking this particular AD case: the European 
Footwear Alliance (EFA). and the Footwear Association of Importers and Retail chains 
(FAIR) (Eckhardt, 2011).29 
 Yet, despite all these efforts, the EU did impose initial anti-dumping measures (in 
2006) and agreed to an extension of the duties a few years later (2009). This lack of 
responsiveness to the demands of this group of firms clearly boiled down to a lack of political 
clout.30 The political ties between import-competing shoe producers (i.e. the complainants in 
this case) and national and EU officials go back a long way and are very strong, while 
footwear importers and retailers in most countries, and in particular at the EU level, lack these 
historical political connections. As one interviewee, who was deeply involved in the case, 
declared: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The EFA was a joint initiative of the Federation of the European Sporting Goods Industry (FESI) – which 
represents the interests of big European sport shoe producers (e.g. Adidas, Asics, Diadora, Fila, Lotto, Puma, 
Reebok) as well as national sports industry federations from across the EU – and The European Branded 
Footwear Coalition (EBFC) consisting of big branded marketers of so called high-quality dress shoes (e.g. 
ECCO, Timberland, Caterpillar, Merrell, Hush Puppies, Uggs, Tevan, Simple, New Balance Kickers, Speedo, 
Ellesse and KangaROOS). FAIR, on the other hand, was an initiative of some very big footwear retailers such as 
Deichmann and Wortmann and footwear companies such as Columbia, Clarcks, and Skechers. 
30 Interviews, Brussels, 8 January, 18 February, 25 March and 7 April 2010.   
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“There was a lot of coordination between the European Commission and the European 
Confederation of the Footwear Industry (CEC) and its lawyers during the entire 
process, which appeared to be very important for the final outcome of the case. This 
link between the Commission and the industry is something natural and without such 
strong ties you are lost….footwear retailers and other importers lack this close 
relationship and therefore it’s much more difficult for them to weigh on the decision-
making process.”31 
 
What is more, policy-makers generally consider import-dependent firms and in particular 
retailers to add less value to the EU economy than other types of firms. Their political clout in 
terms of employment and investment is thus considered weaker than that of the producers, 
who supported the trade-restrictive measures. The concerns of firms that produce and sell 
their shoes domestically are taken more seriously than those of importers, given their 
supposedly bigger (historical) contribution to employment. Also the concerns of exporters are 
usually more visible on the political radar screen than those of importers.32 EU policy-makers, 
in the words of an interviewee, “believe that benefits from trade come mainly from exports, 
while imports are regarded as costs….as a result there is a distinguished political bias against 
importers and in particular retailers…footwear and other retailers are often seen as middle 
man that basically just charge a fee for matching foreign production with domestic 
consumption, something that is considered to be unnecessary or not having any particular 
value.”33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Interview, Brussels, 25 March 2010.  
32 For a more in-depth discussion on the political role and influence of firms in EU anti-dumping policy see De 
Bièvre and Eckhardt (2011) and Eckhardt (2013).	  	  
33 Interview, Brussels, 18 February 2010. 
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 The European Commission thus showed itself unresponsive to demands from the 
European footwear-importing firms, both during the initial AD cases and the expiry review. 
The firms in question were very unhappy with this result and feared that there would be yet 
another review, and a likely extension, of the duties. As there was also little hope that another 
round of lobbying in EU Member State capitals and in Brussels would result in a decision to 
lift the AD measures, the firms expanded their approach and together with their Chinese 
suppliers approached the Chinese authorities in order to convince them to bring a WTO case 
against the EU challenging the questionable aspects of EU anti-dumping measures against 
Chinese footwear products.34 “The ultimate goal of the European footwear importers and their 
Chinese suppliers was broader than just preventing further extensions of the anti-dumping 
measures in force at the time…rather, they hoped to also preclude future EU trade cases in the 
sector.” 35 
There were clearly a number of reasons why these EU footwear importers and retailers 
were able to engage in transnational lobbying for WTO litigation. Apart from being well 
endowed, these firms operate in a highly consolidated sector, face relatively low collective 
action costs, and were already well organized politically. These preconditions had already 
enabled them to establish ad-hoc interest groups in order to coordinate and streamline their 
lobbying efforts during the initial anti-dumping case at home and now also facilitated the 
setting up of a lobby campaign in China and enabled them to hire an impressive team of trade 
and WTO lawyers – which in turn meant that they had a strong ability to identify the WTO-
illegal trade practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interviews, Brussels, 7 April 2010 and 10 April 2013.    
35 Interview, Brussels, 10 April 2013. 
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The lobby campaign, which was set up by the EU firms dependent on Chinese imports 
and their representatives, consisted of two crucial and well-planned steps. 36 The first step was 
for the EU footwear firms in question to approach their Chinese suppliers and convince them 
to form an alliance in order to put pressure on Chinese decision-makers to bring a WTO case 
against the EU’s AD measures. One of the interviewees recalls that, although it took some 
time to convince the Chinese suppliers, “there was in the end a lot of support from the 
Chinese industry for this WTO case.”37 Support came in particular from individual firms, as 
well as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.38 The next step was to convince the Chinese 
leadership to file the WTO complaint. To this end, the EU firms – and their Chinese 
counterparts – hired a law firm to engage in a very thorough analysis of all the crucial aspects 
of the potential WTO case, and a group of representatives of EU and Chinese firms paid 
several visits to high-level Chinese decision-makers. It appeared to be a challenging task to 
convince the Chinese leadership to bring the WTO case. In general, countries do not start a 
WTO case unless they know they have a very good chance of winning. This was (and is) 
especially true for China, which joined the WTO only recently and did not want to lose face 
and/or run the risk of starting a trade war over an issue that is not of pivotal importance to 
them and their domestic industry. Since China had only brought one other WTO case against 
the EU at that time, it was crucial for the Chinese government to know from the European 
importers and their Chinese suppliers whether (a) the EU was really violating WTO law, (b) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The evidence presented in this section stems from interviews with people who were deeply involved in the 
case. Interviews took place in Brussels on 7 April 2010 and 10 April 2013.    
37 Interview, Brussels, 10 April 2013. 
38 As a reason for this particular domestic coalition, an interviewee suggests the following: “like in most sectors, 
the Chinese footwear industry is not very well organized politically on a sectoral level, so political pressure had 
to come from big individual companies and the Chamber of commerce rather than sector specific umbrella 
organizations,” Interview, Brussels, 10 April 2013.	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what the (domestic) economic effects of winning the case for China would be, (c) whether the 
Chinese industry was also in favour of a WTO case, and (d) whether the legal case was strong 
enough to result in a positive panel ruling. 
Despite their initial hesitation, the Chinese authorities did decide in the end to bring 
the WTO dispute settlement case against the EU’s anti-dumping measures on footwear from 
China. Our interview partners clearly confirm39 that the lobby efforts by EU footwear 
importers (supported by Chinese exporters) were crucial in convincing the Chinese 
government to instigate the case. Particularly important was that the EU footwear importers, 
together with their Chinese suppliers, managed to convince the authorities in China that 
pursuing an international litigation procedure would also create enhanced opportunities for 
Chinese footwear exports. At the beginning of 2010, a crucial meeting took place between the 
EU firms, representatives of the Chinese business associations and the Chinese Minister of 
Trade, in this regard. During this meeting, the Minister of Trade took the decision that China 
would bring a WTO complaint against the EU.40 Shortly afterwards, on 4 February 2010, 
China requested WTO consultations with the EU concerning EU measures in connection with 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of footwear from China. The consultations 
between the two parties failed to resolve the dispute, so China requested the establishment of 
a panel in July 2010. The Chinese government immediately hired the same legal team that had 
assisted the EU footwear importers during the EU AD case. It took the panel much longer 
than anticipated to finish its report. Although most of the claims of the Chinese were rejected, 
the panel did rule in favour of China on some crucial points (see Dunoff and Moore, 2014).41 
Although the WTO case is still not entirely resolved, the European footwear importers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Interviews, Brussels, 7 April 2010 and 10 April 2013.    
40 Interview, Brussels, 10 April 2013 
41 See also: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds405_e.htm.  
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obtained what they wanted. On 16 March 2011, the Commission published the following 
statement: “[…] the Commission gives notice that the anti-dumping measure [on footwear 
with uppers of leather originating in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam] will shortly 
expire.”42 As a result, the EU's anti-dumping duties on shoes from China expired on April 1, 
2011. 
Just as the US’s unresponsiveness led US gambling firms to engage in transnational 
lobbying and venue shopping via Antigua, the Chinese authorities were the venue of choice 
for EU footwear-importing firms to bring down the boomerang of a Chinese WTO complaint 
against the EU.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this article, we have explored the preconditions for transnational lobbying by firms in WTO 
litigation. By providing an extensive overview of the literature on the involvement of private 
industry in WTO dispute settlement, we have shown how this literature has mainly looked at 
traditional WTO cases in which firms engage in domestic lobbying targeting their own home 
governments. The main actors in such cases are domestic export-dependent firms (on the 
complainant side) and import-competing firms (on the defendant side). 
 In this article, however, we have highlighted the potential growing importance of a 
different dynamic characterizing some WTO dispute settlement cases. Instead of lobbying 
their own government, firms try and convince a foreign government to bring a case against 
the home country of the firms in question. We argue that the starting point of such a dynamic 
is that firms are confronted with losses in revenue as a result of trade barriers imposed by their 
domestic government and, when lobbying in favour of lifting these protectionist measures, 
they find that same domestic government to be unresponsive to their political demands. If this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Official Journal of the European Union C82/4, 16 March 2011. 
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happens, the firms in question can take advantage of the multiplicity of opportunities 
available within the multilateral trading system by instigating a foreign government to file a 
WTO complaint on the firms’ behalf against these firms’ own domestic government. 
 Although an unresponsive domestic government is the key trigger for firms to 
consider transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping, firms participating in such an 
effort must first overcome several obstacles. They have to overcome collective action 
problems, monitor and collect information about domestic WTO-illegal trade practices, assess 
the costs and benefits of abolishing them (for themselves and the foreign government) and 
gain access to and influence foreign decision-makers. The findings in this article indicate that 
only internationally active firms in well-endowed sectors with a high concentration ratio, and 
an already high mobilization rate are able to pull off the trick of political mobilization and 
maintaining the investment in producing the collective good of detailed information needed 
by foreign governments in the process of WTO litigation. 
 In the two WTO cases studied in this article – the US–Antigua gambling case and the 
EU–China footwear case – US gambling firms and EU footwear producers did indeed face 
domestic trade barriers and unresponsive governments. The rejection of these firms’ demands 
by the US and the EU caused these to return to them as boomerangs, when the firms in 
question shifted their lobbying efforts to the authorities of their host countries and convinced 
them to challenge the EU and US protectionist measures through a formal WTO dispute 
settlement complaint by a foreign government. US gambling firms aimed their transnational 
lobbying efforts and foreign venue shopping at Antigua and Barbuda, while EU footwear 
firms chose the Chinese government as the venue to obtain the filing of a WTO complaint 
against the trade barriers in question. Both the US gambling firms and the EU footwear firms 
were able to mobilize politically and to set up a costly, intensive and time-consuming 
transnational lobby campaign because they faced relatively few impediments to collective 
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action, had the legal, political and financial means to identify WTO-inconsistent trade 
practices, found their domestic government to be unresponsive to their demands to lift the 
trade barriers, and found a foreign WTO member willing to file the WTO case. 
  Although we have illustrated the cogency of our argument explaining transnational 
lobbying and foreign venue shopping by relying on empirical evidence regarding two 
particular WTO disputes, we have no reason to believe that the logic described in this article 
is not also applicable to WTO dispute settlement cases concerning other countries and/or 
other sectors. We found (initial) evidence that transnational lobbying has also driven other 
recent WTO cases, such as the WTO complaint brought by a group of countries against 
Australia’s rules on the plain packaging of tobacco products, as well the solar panel cases 
brought by China against the US and the EU. It would be worthwhile to explore these cases 
and others in more detail to see if our argument still holds and to get a better idea as to how 
often transnational lobbying takes place in the context of WTO litigation. The WTO observers 
and experts we interviewed for this article do see a clear trend towards more transnational 
lobbying. One of our interviewees – an eminent WTO expert – put it as follows: “nowadays I 
see several [WTO dispute settlement] cases a year which clearly seem to be driven by 
transnational lobbying…it is obvious that in the current political and economic context firms 
no longer solely lobby their own government, but increasingly go to other governments than 
its own to bring a case to the WTO.” According to this expert a “particular good place to look 
for transnational lobbying are multi-complainant cases.”43 It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that, in the years ahead, we will see an increasing number of WTO disputes being driven by 
transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping rather than traditional domestic lobbying. 
As the globalization of production and services in general, and the emergence of global value 
chains and global production networks in particular, is on the rise, the inter-state dispute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Telephone interview, 25 March 2013. 
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settlement mechanism of the WTO may also be set for a gradual transformation towards more 
transnational enforcement of the market access commitments its members entered into. 
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